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DNA – Intimate Information or Trash for Public Consumption?
Thursday, July 24th, 2008
Melanie D. Wilson 1
“Surreptitious sampling” may be police officers’ trump card in cracking otherwise unsolvable crimes as serious as murder, arson and rape. Law
enforcement officers engage in surreptitious sampling when they covertly collect DNA2 samples from unsuspecting people, who inadvertently leave behind
hair, skin cells, saliva or other biological materials.3 Surreptitious sampling is a terrific crime-resolution tool. It allows diligent law enforcement officers to
collect proof-positive evidence of guilt or innocence without the hassle of obtaining a warrant and absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe
that the contributor of the biological evidence committed a crime. Provided an officer has the energy and savvy to gather a hair or other biological sample
for testing, she can gather information with the potential to definitively link someone to a crime. Not even a hunch is necessary to justify the quest; yet,
DNA processing technology “lets crime laboratories derive a full profile from a minute amount of biological material at relatively low cost.” 4 Perhaps
because of its effectiveness and the lack of legislative or judicial regulation of the practice, surreptitious sampling is growing in popularity. Recently, the
New York Times highlighted this evidence-gathering method. According to the article, “Over the last few years, several hundred suspects have been
implicated by the traces of DNA they unwittingly shed well after the crime was committed[.]“ 5
Although great for solving crime, some contend that surreptitious sampling is a tragedy for personal privacy and freedom because it threatens to expose
significant amounts of intensely private information about citizens’ health, gender, race and lineage to the government. 6 One federal district court judge
remarked, “[T]he relative ease with which a DNA sample may be obtained renders questionable the ability to realistically protect any genetic privacy
interest . . . .”7
This essay argues a middle position—that the well-established Fourth Amendment rule of “abandonment” can strike an appropriate, “reasonable” balance
to serve law enforcement needs for surreptitious sampling, while simultaneously protecting citizen privacy.

I. The Query
Is surreptitious sampling constitutional? If so, are there any limits to restrict officers from capitalizing on the increasingly public nature of everyday living?
Do officers act constitutionally if they blend into a crowd, bump me as I enjoy a public parade and, without my knowledge, pull several of my hairs for
DNA processing? To protect our privacy, dignity and personal security from surreptitious sampling, must we live as secluded as the Unabomber? 8

II. The Law
Although police frequently collect and use surreptitiously acquired DNA,9 there are still few judicial opinions on the topic and even fewer legal articles
analyzing the practice.10 The Supreme Court has yet to decide under what circumstances surreptitious sampling may violate the Constitution. Thus, the
handful of courts to confront challenges to evidence obtained by surreptitious sampling have usually turned to general Fourth Amendment 11 principles for
guidance on whether or not to permit the prosecutor’s use of such evidence.12 One legal commentator contends that “[c]onstitutional law offers virtually no
protection” for those targeted for surreptitious sampling and that “existing Fourth Amendment law is ill-suited to the facts of abandoned DNA
collection[,]“13 but this essay contends that courts are right to rely on basic Fourth Amendment concepts. Fourth Amendment principles can strike an
appropriate balance, allowing the government to collect valuable evidence, while providing for reasonable boundaries to limit unduly intrusive DNA
collection.14 More specifically, courts can foster both law enforcement and privacy interests by applying the Fourth Amendment principles of voluntary
abandonment vigorously. I dub this test the “patent abandonment standard.”
The basic abandonment principle is found in California v. Greenwood, in which the Supreme Court explained that a person loses Fourth Amendment
protection in his belongings by abandoning them.15 There, the Court held that law enforcement officers do not implicate Fourth Amendment rights when
they conduct a warrantless search of opaque garbage bags left on the curb in front of a suspect’s home, reasoning that a warrantless search or seizure of
“the garbage bags left at the curb outside the [suspect's] house would violate the Fourth Amendment only if [someone] manifested a subjective expectation
of privacy in th[e] garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable.”16 The Court concluded that any expectation of privacy in the contents of the
opaque garbage bags at issue was not objectively reasonable because the bags were: 1) “readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and

other members of the public”;17 2) placed at the curb “for the express purpose of conveying it to . . . the trash collector”;18 and 3) “particularly suited for
public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it[.]“19 In other words, when someone
knowingly and intentionally leaves his garbage or his biological matter exposed to the public without exerting an effort to retain control of it, he loses all
Fourth Amendment protection for that trash, biological or not.
Especially instructive to potential limits on surreptitious sampling is the Supreme Court’s use of active verbs to describe a person’s exposure of his
belongings to the public. According to the Court, a person loses his expectation of privacy only by “le[aving]” the bags at the street to “convey[]” the
refuse to the trash collector; by “deposit[ing]” the garbage in an area suited to public consumption;20 by “knowingly expos[ing]” the bags to the public;21
and by “‘voluntarily turn[ing them] over to third parties.’”22 In short, the Court has concentrated on the active, volitional, “patent” abandonment of
materials. Accordingly, when law enforcement officers surreptitiously gather DNA from an unsuspecting person, who unwittingly turns over his or her
biological material to a third party and fails to voluntarily or actively make it “readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public,” a strong argument can be made that officers exceed Fourth Amendment limits and violate reasonable expectations of privacy,
unless they act with probable cause, reasonable suspicion and/or a warrant.

III. Application of the Law to Surreptitious Sampling
Because a persuasive argument can be made that the Fourth Amendment proscribes some surreptitious sampling, the government should be guided by a
single dominant standard when it engages in the practice. Officers should collect biological evidence from a public place without probable cause or a
warrant, only if and when someone actively, voluntarily and freely abandons the biological matter.23 Such “patent abandonment” demonstrates that the
person has relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy he may have had in the biological and otherwise highly personal matter. Moreover, to strike
the proper balance between law enforcement needs and privacy for the people, the terms “freely” and “voluntarily” must be interpreted to have their
normal, colloquial meanings.24 Using common-sense definitions of these terms should ensure that protection for citizens’ private information is not
inadvertently lost every time someone enters civilization to buy groceries, visit a friend or work.25
The government’s ability to gather intimate, biological material from its citizens and use that material as evidence in a subsequent criminal proceeding
should not reduce interactions between citizens and their government to a playground game of finders keepers, losers weepers. The issue should not be
whether someone unwittingly lost his skin, hair or saliva. The more appropriate query is whether the person voluntarily left such materials behind—a
“patent abandonment.”
Cite as: Melanie D. Wilson, DNA – Intimate Information or Trash for Public Consumption?, TEXSUPP (2008), available at
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